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Abstract
Background: Vietnam introduced the Health Care Fund for the Poor in 2002 to increase access
to health care and reduce the financial burden of health expenditure faced by the poor and ethnic
minorities. It is often argued that effects of financing reforms take a long time to materialize. This
study evaluates the short-term impact of the program to determine if pro-poor financing programs
can achieve immediate effects on health care utilization and out-of-pocket expenditure.
Method: Considering that the program is a non-random policy initiative rolled out nationally, we
apply propensity score matching with both single differences and double differences to data from
the Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys 2002 (pre-program data) and 2004 (first post-
program data).
Results: We find a small, positive impact on overall health care utilization. We find evidence of
two substitution effects: from private to public providers and from primary to secondary and
tertiary level care. Finally, we find a strong negative impact on out-of-pocket health expenditure.
Conclusion: The results indicate that the Health Care Fund for the Poor is meeting its objectives
of increasing utilization and reducing out-of-pocket expenditure for the program's target
population, despite numerous administrative problems resulting in delayed and only partial
implementation in most provinces. The main lessons for low and middle-income countries from
Vietnam's early experiences with the Health Care Fund for the Poor are that it managed to achieve
positive outcomes in a short time-period, the need to ensure adequate and sustained funding for
targeted programs, including marginal administrative costs, develop effective targeting mechanisms
and systems for informing beneficiaries and providers about the program, respond to the increased
demand for health care generated by the program, address indirect costs of health care utilization,
and establish and maintain routine and systematic monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
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Introduction
Out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure is the principal source
of health financing in many developing countries, partic-
ularly in Asia [1]. In Vietnam, the share of OOP is around
64% of total health expenditure [2]. Given the low cover-
age of health insurance, specifically in the informal sector
(which in Vietnam mainly consists of farmers and the self-
employed), this exposes large parts of the population to
two major risks. First, they may become impoverished or
pushed further into poverty due to health expenditure [3].
Second, those households who delay or forego health care
due to financial constraints are exposed to the detrimental
impact of such decisions on their health status [4]. A study
of Demographic and Health Surveys in 56 developing
countries found that the poor consistently fared worse
than their better-off peers in terms of health care utiliza-
tion and health outcomes [5].
Different strategies have been used to try to improve
access to health services by the poor and provide financial
risk protection [6]. One strategy is to provide universal
coverage of services to the whole population. The evi-
dence on the effectiveness of this strategy is rather discour-
aging; public health expenditure often benefits the better-
off more than the poor in developing countries, at least
until universal coverage has been reached, which can take
several years [7,8]. Subsidies may also benefit the rich
after universal coverage has been fully achieved. Another
strategy is to target interventions directly at the poor.
Examples of such interventions include the PROGRESA/
Oportunidades program in Mexico [9], health insurance for
the poor in Colombia [10], and health insurance for the
indigent in the Philippines [11].
The situation in Vietnam is very similar to that in other
countries in Asia. OOP expenditure is the dominant
source of health financing; almost 75% of total private
expenditure is incurred at the point of use of health serv-
ices [12]. This places a disproportionately heavier burden
of health expenditure on the poor [13,14]. Wagstaff and
van Doorslaer have estimated that OOP expenditures con-
tributed to an increase in the number of absolute poor by
3.4 percentage points at the end of the 1990s [15]. Policies
such as fee reductions, exemptions and free health insur-
ance for the poor were initiated by the Government of
Vietnam in the late 1990s, but coverage and effectiveness
of these earlier policies were limited, partly due to insuffi-
cient central budget allocations to finance these policies
[16]. For example, Nguyen found only limited or no
impact of these programs on utilization and OOP expend-
iture [17]. It is therefore not surprising that inequalities in
health utilization and outcomes widened between 1997
and 2002 [5]. For example, the ratio of under-five mortal-
ity for the poorest 20% vs. the richest 20% increased by
22%.
In 2002, in a major policy reform known as "Decision
139", the Government attempted to address the short-
comings of the previous policies by establishing the
Health Care Fund for the Poor (HCFP) [18]. As with pre-
vious policies, the new strategy aimed at reducing finan-
cial barriers to health care access among vulnerable
groups of the population, with the additional expectation
that this would contribute to poverty reduction. In con-
trast to previous policies, however, Decision 139 commit-
ted the central government to back up the policy with
significant financial resources [19]. Three-quarters of the
total allocation per capita (USD 4.5 in 2002, more than a
doubling of central government subsidies compared to
earlier programs) is guaranteed by the central govern-
ment; the rest is to be raised by the provinces. It also sig-
nificantly increased the number of beneficiaries of
government health financing policies; to 14.6 million
people in 2002, which was equal to 18% of the total pop-
ulation. The target population is identified by methods
developed to identify beneficiaries of the Hunger Eradica-
tion and Poverty Reduction program and includes a mix
of individual characteristic and geographical targeting.
Beneficiaries include households classified as poor
according to the official poverty line, all ethnic minority
residents of designated mountainous provinces, and all
residents of communes classified as socio-economically
disadvantaged. Provincial management boards were
established to oversee program implementation. Decision
139 outlined two options for providing benefits; the man-
agement boards could purchase health insurance cards
from the national health insurance system managed by
Vietnam Social Security or directly reimburse health facil-
ities for provision of services to the beneficiaries.
During the time period covered by this study, the program
covered inpatient and outpatient care at public providers
only. In 2005, revised health insurance regulations
allowed for private sector provision of health insurance
benefits, including to HCFP beneficiaries. However, to
date very few private providers have been contracted to
provide health insurance benefits. The package is gener-
ous, covering the costs of consultations, diagnosis, treat-
ment, and rehabilitation during the time of treatment at
the health facility; lab tests, diagnostic imaging, and other
diagnostic techniques; medicines on the list drawn up by
the MOH; blood and transfusions; medical procedures
and surgery; use of materials, medical equipment, and
treatment bed; and assistance at delivery. The package also
includes some preventive interventions such as antenatal
care. There are some exclusions to the benefits. For exam-
ple, health insurance does not reimburse fees for certain
health problems or treatments because of the elective
nature of the intervention, or because those health prob-
lems are covered by other government programs, such as
the Expanded Program for Immunization or disease-spe-International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:20 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/20
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cific national programs. Benefits are valid directly upon
issuance of the health insurance card. The Health Care
Fund for the Poor covers costs up to 20,000,000 Vietnam-
ese Dong (for each treatment episode), which was equiv-
alent to USD 1,240 on January 1, 2004. The program also
pays for transportation costs related to referral to higher-
level facilities and some provinces have piloted payment
of food costs for beneficiaries and caretakers.
Many recent studies have measured the effects of health
insurance and other government-subsidized programs to
increase access and financial risk protection of the poor in
low and middle-income countries. Waters measured the
impact of two health insurance programs in Ecuador and
found mixed results: one of the programs had a strong
positive association with use of curative care, but not for
preventive care; the other program, directed at farmers,
had positive but insignificant associations with both types
of care [20]. Yip and Berman evaluated the impact of
Egypt's school health insurance program and found that
the program significantly improved access to health care,
but increased inequalities as children not attending
school tend to be poor and live in rural areas and thereby
miss out on the program benefits [21]. Liu et al. studied
the effects of urban health insurance reform in China and
found that the reform led to significant increases in utili-
zation of outpatient care by lower socioeconomic groups
[22]. Hidayat et al. assessed the impact on equity of two
mandatory health insurance schemes in Indonesia [23].
They found that the two schemes had a positive impact on
access to care, but they did not find an impact on equity.
Trujillo et al. evaluated the impact of Colombia's subsi-
dized health insurance program on health care utilization
and found that the program significantly increased utiliza-
tion among the country's poor and uninsured [24]. Wag-
staff  et al. evaluated the impact of China's New
Cooperative Medical Scheme, which is a subsidized rural
health insurance scheme, and found that the scheme
increased utilization, but found no impact on OOP
expenditure or on utilization among the poor [25]. Wag-
staff and Yu estimated the impacts of a health reform
project in China that combines supply-side interventions
to improve quality of care with demand-side measures to
expand health insurance and provide financial support to
the very poor [26]. Their results suggest that the project
reduced OOP and catastrophic expenditure and impover-
ishment due to health expenditure, but there was limited
impact on utilization and mixed evidence regarding
health outcomes.
Of particular relevance to the present study, Wagstaff
examined the impact of Decision 139 in Vietnam using
data from the 2004 Vietnam Household Living Standard
Survey (VHLSS) [27]. Wagstaff used propensity score
matching (PSM) with single differences to estimate the
impact on health care utilization and expenditures,
including differences in impact between the poorest
groups compared to the rest of the eligible population. He
found that while HCFP increased use of health services
and reduced catastrophic expenditure, there was little
impact on OOP expenditure and utilization in the poorest
decile. The main contributions of this paper that add
value vis-à-vis the paper by Wagstaff (2007) are as follows.
First, we apply both single and double differences analy-
sis, which enables us to estimate the impact when using
panel data. Second, we use slightly different estimation
techniques and it is important to analyze an issue in dif-
ferent ways, and with different methods, to establish
validity of results. Finally, we have in-depth knowledge of
the Vietnamese context, which enables us to interpret the
findings in a policy relevant manner. The added value is
further discussed in several parts of the paper.
The purpose of the present study is to evaluate the impact
of the HCFP on health care utilization and expenditure in
Vietnam during the initial period of implementation
(2003–2004). The main contributions of our paper to the
literature are three-fold. First, this paper constitutes the
first systematic assessment using advanced non-rand-
omized program evaluation techniques of what is the
most ambitious health financing program in Vietnam to
date and which is also of interest to other reforming coun-
tries. Second, we analyze the short-term impact of the pro-
gram to determine if pro-poor financing programs can
achieve immediate effects on key outcome indicators.
Third, we draw policy lessons and recommendations for
other low- and middle-income countries undertaking or
considering similar health financing reforms.
In order to identify an appropriate methodology and
choose relevant outcome variables, we formulated several
research hypotheses. First, the HCFP would increase
health care utilization. Second, utilization would be
shifted from private to state facilities. Third, the use of self-
treatment, such as purchasing of drugs directly from phar-
macies and drug vendors, would decrease. Finally OOP
and catastrophic health expenditures would decrease. To
test our hypotheses, we compare the differences in utiliza-
tion and expenditure outcomes between two groups of
people who were eligible to receive benefits: those who
had received a card and those who had not. (In a sensitiv-
ity analysis we conduct two additional comparisons.) We
apply the technique of propensity score matching (PSM)
with single differences in a cross-section analysis of
VHLSS 2004, as well as a double differences analysis using
a panel dataset from the VHLSS 2002 and 2004. In the
study we find several important results.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:20 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/20
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion explains the data sources and methods. The following
section presents the results. The final section concludes
with a discussion of the results, policy implications and
lessons learned for other low and middle-income coun-
tries currently undertaking similar health financing
reforms.
Methods
Data sources
This study uses data from the 2002 and 2004 Vietnam
Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS). Both data-
sets are relatively large and nationally representative and
were collected through a stratified cluster sampling
design. The 2004 survey contained a total of 9,188 house-
holds with 40,438 individuals. Almost one-third to half of
the households interviewed in 2004 were previously inter-
viewed in 2002. While the sample size in the panel data is
thus smaller, the possibility of constructing a panel data-
set for the impact evaluation was the main reason we
chose the VHLSS as opposed to other datasets that may be
richer in health variables, but that provide only cross-sec-
tion data. The panel data allows us to eliminate bias from
fixed effects. We will discuss the differences between the
cross-section and panel datasets and the implications for
the analysis in the Results and Discussion sections.
Another important advantage of the VHLSS is that it con-
tains a wide range of indicators that can be used to iden-
tify beneficiary status and determinants thereof. Such
indicators are often missing in health-specific surveys. The
VHLSS also contains sufficient data on health care utiliza-
tion and expenditure. The 2002 survey serves as a baseline
in comparisons of outcomes before and after implemen-
tation of the policy. The 2003–2004 period covered in the
2004 survey corresponds to the first year of implementa-
tion of the policy (Table 1). As discussed above, it should
be noted that this allows for an assessment of the short-
term impact; the full impact of the policy may not have
emerged at this early stage. However, the program's scale
and high cost, and the Government of Vietnam's
expressed need to receive an early indication of its effec-
tiveness in order to decide on the need for possible revi-
sions to the policy, warrants an early study of the
program's impact.
To estimate the impact on health care utilization, we
examine the following population (outcome) indicators:
number of inpatient admissions and outpatient visits to
commune-level health facilities, district hospitals, and
provincial or central hospitals in the public health system,
and to any type of professionally trained private provider.
In the 2002 VHLSS there were no separate variables for
"district level hospitals" and "provincial/central hospital",
so those variables could not be included in the panel anal-
ysis. Those variables could however be captured in the
panel analysis as a group by the variable "all state hospi-
tals". Inpatient admissions in private facilities were not
included in the analysis due to their very low frequency in
both 2002 and 2004.
To estimate the impact on health expenditure, we
included the following variables: total household and per
capita expenditure on health, household expenditure on
inpatient and outpatient care and self-medication, and
two measures of catastrophic expenditure: the proportion
of households that incurred expenditure on health higher
than 20% or 40% of non-food expenditure. We used
household total expenditure as the measure of socio-eco-
nomic status, given that wealth and consumption have
been found to be unreliable indicators of socio-economic
status. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the out-
comes studied for both the full sample and those eligible
for HCFP in 2004.
Because provinces implemented the policy at different
speeds, not all eligible beneficiaries had received a card by
the time data for the VHLSS 2004 was collected. While
this effect was obviously not positive for those who
Table 1: Timeline of data sources and policy implementation
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004
Q u a r t e r 1234123412341234
R e f e r e n c e  p e r i o d  o f  V H L S S  2 0 0 2 xxxxxxx
Decision 139 passed x
H C F P  m a n a g e m e n t  b o a r d s  s e t  u p xxxxxxxx
Reimbursement of health services begins x xxxxx
Reference period of VHLSS 2004 xxxxxxxInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:20 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/20
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should have received cards in a more timely fashion, it
was advantageous for the impact evaluation in that it
allowed for comparison of impacts between people with
very similar characteristics in a randomized way.
Propensity score matching
We would like to observe the participants' outcomes with
and without treatment. The treatment effect of an individ-
ual i can be written as:
where Y is the "outcome of interest"
However, it is clearly not possible to observe both out-
comes for the same individual at the same time, which
means that we cannot estimate the individual treatment
effect τi. Instead, we have to estimate population average
treatment effects. The parameter that has received the
most attention in the evaluation literature is the "average
treatment effect on the treated" (ATT), which is the
parameter that we will use in this study. ATT can be
defined as:
where D is treatment status and takes a value of 1 for the
treated and 0 for the untreated
To estimate impact of the HCFP, we apply the method of
propensity score matching (PSM), which has been found
to be a useful technique in the impact evaluation field
[28]. In order to minimize selection bias associated with
non-experimental data, the objective of matching is to
find in a large group of non-participants those individuals
who are similar to the participants in observed pre-treat-
ment characteristics X. That being done, and assuming
that the two groups do not differ in relevant unobserva-
bles, differences in outcomes between these two groups
can be attributed to the program [29]. Rosenbaum and
Rubin suggest the use of balancing scores b(X), i.e. func-
tions of the relevant observed co-variates X that would be
expected to be equal for both groups if the conditional
distribution of X is independent of assignment into treat-
ment [30]. One possible balancing score is the propensity
score, i.e. the probability of participating in a program
given observed characteristics X.
There is limited advice available regarding which func-
tional form to use to estimate the propensity score (see
e.g. the discussion in [31]). In principle any discrete
choice model can be used. We estimated the propensity
score with a logistic regression. The dependent variable in
the regression indicates the treated and untreated (com-
parison) group. Because all eligible beneficiaries should
be issued a health insurance card or a free health care card
according to the implementation guidelines of the HCFP
and a majority had been issued a card at the time of the
τ ii i =− YY () () 10 (1)
ττ ATT == = = − = ED E Y D E Y D (| ) [( ) | ] [() | ] 11 10 1
(2)
Table 2: Descriptive statistics – outcome variables, 2004
Full sample HCFP eligible
Utilization Mean Standard error Mean Standard error
No. of outpatient (OP) visits in the 12-month recall period 0.990331 0.013564 0.784695 0.023113
no. of OP visits at commune level clinics 0.232479 0.005542 0.317338 0.011274
no. of OP visits at district hospital 0.119591 0.003903 0.110438 0.008076
no. of OP visits at provincial/central hospital 0.120778 0.004495 0.050821 0.005396
no. of OP visits at govt. hospital 0.240368 0.006001 0.161259 0.009783
no. of OP visits at private facility 0.493966 0.010409 0.289875 0.017243
No. of inpatient (IP) admissions in the 12-month recall period 0.095875 0.002429 0.107604 0.006065
no. of IP admissions at commune level clinics 0.014145 0.000728 0.022869 0.001745
no. of IP admissions at district hospital 0.03749 0.001434 0.047987 0.003491
no. of IP admissions at provincial/central hospital 0.040605 0.001564 0.031763 0.003538
no. of IP admissions at govt. hospital 0.078095 0.002242 0.07975 0.005576
Expenditure (in Vietnamese Dong, VND)
Real per capita annual household health expenditure in the 12-month recall period 270.4715 3.8209 157.5965 5.038973
Real annual household health expenditure 1304.939 17.23415 798.0596 20.71008
Real annual household expenditure on OP care 463.8379 7.076816 262.0579 7.853138
Real annual household expenditure on IP care 522.9289 13.80825 333.0659 15.96045
Real annual household expenditure on self-medication 264.8263 2.639633 187.1645 4.547569
% of households with catastrophic health expenditure (20%) 0.184282 0.001928 0.210907 0.004033
% of households with catastrophic health expenditure (40%) 0.060537 0.001186 0.070563 0.002532
Source: Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey, 2004International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:20 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/20
Page 6 of 17
(page number not for citation purposes)
2004 VHLSS survey, we used possession of a card (or not)
to indicate the treated and untreated (comparison) group
in the cross-section analysis 2004. For the panel analysis
2002–2004, identification was based on possession of a
card in the 2004 survey (as the 2002 data were collected
before the policy was implemented), while explanatory
variables were taken primarily from the 2002 survey.
While two variables, illness and school attendance in the
last 12 months recorded in the 2004 survey, may be
affected by treatment (receipt of a card or not) and thus
make them endogenous. While illness may affect whether
or not someone receives a card because people with severe
illness may receive greater sympathy from the people
assessing poverty, it is unlikely that illness would be
affected by whether someone receives a HCFP card or not.
Utilization of health services, on the other hand, would be
affected, as we hypothesize and which is supported by the
results.
We do not think that receipt of a card would affect school
attendance, as no money is given to the family when they
have a card. However, if the family suffered an illness and
had a card, they might be less likely to withdraw their chil-
dren from school for lack of money. However, in our
exploratory analysis of outcomes, we didn't find any effect
on school enrollments when we included that as a poten-
tial outcome variable.
The objective in estimating the logistic regressions is to
predict propensity scores that can be used to improve bal-
ance in the covariates between the treated and matched
untreated groups, i.e. measured baseline covariates have a
similar distribution in the two groups. Only covariates
that could plausibly be expected to influence participation
in the treatment, but that would not be expected to be
influenced by the treatment, should be included in the
model. Whether to include a large or small number of
covariates is not resolved in the literature. The choice of
variables should be based on economic theory and previ-
ous empirical findings. Following Rubin and Thomas
[32], who argue that a variable should only be excluded
from analysis if it is clear that the variable is either unre-
lated to the outcome or not a proper covariate, we
included a relatively large number of covariates. We deter-
mined that, based on economic theory and our experience
of the health sector in Vietnam and knowledge of the
Health Care Fund for the Poor scheme, a number of cov-
ariates could plausibly influence participation in the treat-
ment, but would not be expected to be influenced by the
treatment. Among the covariates included were demo-
graphic variables, location of residence, income in 2002,
poverty status, education and employment variables, ill-
ness in the past 12 months (2004), household size, and
proportion of children and elderly in household (see
Table 3 for a full list).
The included covariates and the results of the logistic
regressions that we used to construct the treated group
and the matched, untreated group are presented in Table
3. The results are generally consistent with factors one
would expect to be correlated with participation in the
program. Greater likelihood of having a card was found in
indicators such as being classified as poor according to the
official poverty line, living in remote communes, and
being interviewed later on in the year when provinces had
more fully implemented the policy. Factors associated
with lower likelihood of participation in the program
included belonging to the majority ethnic group, employ-
ment in the formal sector, and higher educational level.
We checked on the range of the estimated propensity
scores for both treated and untreated sub-samples to iden-
tify the region of common support. This is done to avoid
biased estimates of impact that might result by matching
treated and untreated cases that are very different from
each other. Observations not under common support
were dropped from the analysis.
We also investigated whether trimming of the sample was
needed. If a large share of treated cases are concentrated in
a small range of propensity scores while very few
untreated cases fall into that same range then a given com-
parison may have to be used multiple times, and the esti-
mated program impact will not be reliable in this range. It
was determined that trimming was not needed. Table 4
presents the final sample sizes used to estimate program
impact.
Nearest neighbor matching selects untreated cases with
the closest propensity score to each treated case. Nearest n
neighbors selects a group of n untreated cases with esti-
mated propensity scores nearest to those of the treated
group. This type of matching has a strong advantage in
that the calculations are simple and the program runs
quickly when the sample size is large. In this paper nearest
neighbor matching was used with all the cross-sectional
analysis. The number of nearest neighbors was selected
based on the number that gave the best balance in covari-
ates after matching (as discussed below). Thus in the
cross-section, for the main comparison we used 6 nearest
neighbors, and for the two comparisons in the sensitivity
analysis we used 5 and 2 neighbors, respectively. In the
panel, the best balance was achieved with kernel matching
(as discussed below). However, the two sensitivity com-
parisons, matching with 11 and 2 nearest neighbors,
respectively, resulted in a balance almost equivalent to
that obtained with kernel matching, but with much
shorter running time and with almost no difference in the
impact estimates. Accordingly, we used n nearest neigh-
bor matching to obtain the estimates for the two panel
comparisons in the sensitivity analysis.I
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Table 3: Results of logistic regressions to estimate propensity score
Explanatory variables Eligible with card vs. eligible without a card)
Cross-section 2002 Panel 2004
Female -0.003 -0.023
(-0.14) (-0.68)
Age spline1 (0–6) 0.079 0.023
(2.58)** (0.55)
Age spline (6–12) 0.040 0.040
(2.47)* (1.51)
Age spline (12–45) 0.002 0.013
(0.48) (2.12)*
Age spline (45+) 0.004 0.001
(1.10) (0.07)
Married -0.155 -0.381
(-1.81) (-2.57)*
Registered in commune of residence 0.888 ..
(2.19)*
Attended school during past 12 months (2004) -0.215 -0.162
(-2.64)** (-1.26)
Ill during past 12 months (2004) 0.255 0.341
(2.96)** (2.56)*
Male head of household 0.021 0.458
(0.11) (1.47)
Head is ethnic minority in mountainous province 0.345 -0.029
(1.38) (-0.09)
Household classified as poor 1.554 0.355
(9.86)** (1.63)
Household has poor household certificate from commune 0.839
(2.79)**
Head's occupation: skilled worker -0.025 -0.129
(-0.08) (-0.26)I
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Head's occupation: unskilled worker 0.182 0.416
(0.78) (1.12)
Head's occupation: not working 0.331 0.223
(1.20) (0.48)
Individual employed in formal sector -0.647 -0.651
(-3.83)** (-2.14)*
Head is ethnic Kinh or Chinese -0.536 -0.328
(-2.57)* (-1.13)
Head completed primary schooling -0.058 0.101
(-0.45) (0.52)
Head completed lower secondary schooling 0.037 0.076
(0.22) (0.33)
Head completed upper secondary schooling or above 0.212 0.705
(0.90) (1.97)*
Head's spouse in household -0.046 -0.349
(-0.23) (-1.05)
Household size 0.075 0.010
(2.86)** (0.20)
Proportion of children <16 years in household 0.162 0.988
(0.60) (2.29)*
Proportion of adults >65 years in household -0.089 0.548
(-0.29) (1.11)
Proportion of males in household 0.237 -0.100
(0.86) (-0.22)
Month of interview (2004) 0.087 0.065
(2.13)* (1.04)
Month of interview if reimbursement method changed between 2003 and 2004 -0.079 -0.094
(-3.05)** (-2.43)*
Table 3: Results of logistic regressions to estimate propensity score (Continued)I
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) Urban location -0.042 -0.001
(-0.21) (0.00)
135 commune -0.079 -0.704
(-0.45) (-2.34)*
Commune 20+ kilometers from district capital 0.389 0.431
(2.33)* (1.64)
Remote commune .. 0.218
(0.79)
Commune has pharmacy .. -0.296
(-1.28)
Northeast region -0.150 -0.415
(-0.48) (-0.87)
Northwest region 0.360 -0.244
(1.05) (-0.46)
North Central region -0.050 -0.414
(-0.17) (-0.87)
South Central region 0.378 0.435
(0.92) (0.75)
Central Highlands region 0.222 0.194
(0.68) (0.37)
Southeast region -0.054 -0.231
(-0.17) (-0.42)
Mekong Delta region -0.478 -0.527
(-1.75) (-1.12)
Real per capita monthly expenditures 2002 .. -0.001
(-0.72)
Constant -3.549 -1.258
(-5.19)** (-1.02)
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note: Statistically significant results (95% confidence level) are in boldface.
1Linear splines allow estimation of relationships between dependent and independent variables as a function composed of linear segments. Rather than restricting the coefficient to one value for 
the whole range of ages, it allows different coefficients for different ranges of ages. In our case, the spline is made up of 4 segments, the first from 0 to 6 years, the second from 7 to 12 years, the 
third from 13 to 45 years and the fourth from 45 years and higher. Within each variable, the years below the lowest level are set to 0, the years within the age range are set to the difference 
between the actual age and the highest age of the previous age range, and the ages above the upper age are set to the value for the highest age in the range.
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There are different kinds of matching algorithms that can
be applied in PSM to match cases [29]. Based on prelimi-
nary tests, we used the nearest neighbor algorithm for the
cross-section data, which selects a group of untreated
cases with estimated propensity scores nearest to those of
the treated group. The number of nearest neighbors used
(2, 5, 6, or 11) varied with the sample, depending on
which number achieved the best balance between the two
groups. For the panel data we used kernel matching (with
a bandwidth of 0.06).
The balance of distribution of observed characteristics
between the treated group and the comparison group after
matching is an important criterion for determining if
matching was successful. Initial testing for covariate bal-
ance was done for the estimated propensity score using an
algorithm developed by Dehejia and Wahba [33]. In this
study, adding provincial and regional dummies to the
equation led to important improvements in balance as
the differential implementation of the policy across prov-
inces plays an important role in determining whether or
not a household has received a free health care card or
health insurance for the poor.
We then analyzed two other indicators to further assess
whether balance was achieved: a reduction of the pseudo
R2 of the logistic regression after matching and reduction
in standardized bias as measured by the change in its
mean, median and maximum. A low pseudo R2 indicates
that observable characteristics explain very little of the var-
iation in the propensity scores in the treated and matched
comparison sample. Matching led to substantial reduc-
tions in both indicators (Table 5). However, the results
also indicate that the pseudo R2 does not decrease to zero
after matching, which means that matching reduces but
does not entirely eliminate the potential bias in estimates
of impact due to differences in observed covariates
between the treatment and comparison cases.
Estimating program impact
After suitable comparison groups had been formed using
PSM, the next step in the analysis was to estimate the
impact of Decision 139 on the selected utilization and
expenditure indicators. This study obtained both single
difference and double differences (or differences-in-differ-
ences) estimates. Single difference analysis compares the
outcomes of the treated group to outcomes of the
untreated group at a single point in time and was per-
formed using cross-section data for 2004. Rosenbaum and
Rubin showed that PSM is sufficient to remove bias due to
all observed characteristics in large samples [30]. How-
ever, PSM does not reduce bias due to unobservable char-
acteristics, which means that if unobservable
characteristics determining selection into the treated
group are correlated with outcomes, single difference esti-
mates will be biased.
Table 4: Final sample size for impact analysis
Have card No card Total
Single differences (Cross-section 2004)
Overall sample (2004) 4,844 5,388 10,232
Sample with propensity score estimates 4,843 5,386 10,229
Sample under common support 4,843 5,375 10,218
Sample after trimming and in common support 4,843 5,375 10,218
Sample after matching 4,843 4,656 9,499
Differences in differences (Panel 2002–2004)
Overall sample (2002–2004 Panel) 1,877 2,235 4,112
Sample with propensity score estimates 1,807 2,159 3,966
Sample under common support 1,784 2,151 3,935
Sample after trimming and in common support 1,784 2,151 3,935
Sample after matching 1,784 2,151 3,935
Table 5: Pseudo R2 and absolute standardized bias before and 
after matching
Unmatched Matched
Cross-section
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.006
Mean bias 12.82 2.30
Median Bias 9.36 1.69
SD of bias 11.83 1.83
Minimum bias 0.14 0.06
Maximum bias 53.29 6.77
No. of Explanatory variables 38 38
Panel
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.003
Mean bias 12.42 1.79
Median Bias 10.64 1.41
SD of bias 9.39 1.36
Minimum bias 0.24 0.01
Maximum bias 33.25 5.10
No. of Explanatory variables 42 42International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:20 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/20
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To address potential bias from unobservable characteris-
tics, we also obtain double differences estimates to the
panel dataset 2002–2004. First, we calculated the mean
differences in outcomes before and after the intervention
for the treated and untreated groups separately. Then we
estimated program impact by calculating the difference
between the mean differences of the two groups. The addi-
tional comparison across time eliminates bias resulting
from time-invariant unobserved factors (i.e. fixed effects)
that may be correlated with outcomes. Such "fixed effects"
may include effects from variables such as unobserved
community characteristics (for example, the unobserved
quality of the available health services) or unobserved
household/individual characteristics (for example,
genetic endowments affecting health status). Bias from
unobserved time-variant factors (for example, unobserved
changes in the quality of available health services between
2002 and 2004) may still be present, but is assumed to
introduce negligible bias.
Because the double differences analysis eliminates bias
from fixed effects, the panel analysis may be considered
preferable to the cross-section analysis. However, the
VHLSS panel data may provide a downward biased esti-
mate of the full impact of the Health Care Fund for the
Poor because the 2002 baseline data incorporate the
effects of previous government health care programs for
the poor (which covered about 11% of the poor). We
therefore present and discuss the results of both the cross-
section and panel analyses.
We calculated standard errors for all impact estimates
using bootstrapping techniques of 100 repetitions. There
is some debate about whether bootstrapped standard
errors are appropriate for use with certain matching meth-
ods, such as matching on the basis of one nearest neigh-
bor [34], but it has not been established that it is
inappropriate for kernel matching or for nearest neighbor
matching using more than one nearest neighbor.
All calculations were computed using Stata® version 9.2,
including ado-files developed by Becker and Ichino [35]
and Leuven and Sianesi [36].
Results
We first report results of the cross-section analysis. Then,
we present the findings of the panel data analysis. Finally,
we report the results of a sensitivity analysis.
Cross-section analysis with single differences
Impact on utilization
The results of the analysis of impact of the HCFP on utili-
zation are presented in Table 6. The cross-section results
indicate that the average number of outpatient visits and
inpatient admissions was 4% and 6% higher, respectively,
for the treated compared to the untreated. Neither of these
differences is statistically significant. However, the small
changes in overall utilization mask an interesting, and sta-
tistically significant, substitution effect: the treated group
shifted from private to public providers. The results also
indicate a substitution effect from primary to secondary
and tertiary levels of care. For example, for outpatient care,
the proportional impact was larger at the district and
higher levels of outpatient care compared to commune-
level facilities.
We found a smaller and more mixed impact on the use of
inpatient care (which is much less frequently reported
than outpatient care). For example, the number of admis-
sions to district hospitals and any state hospitals for inpa-
tient care was higher for the treated compared to the
untreated group, but the number of admissions to com-
mune-level facilities and provincial and central level hos-
pitals was higher among the untreated group.
Impact on out-of-pocket expenditure
We found a negative impact of the HCFP on six out of the
seven expenditure variables in the cross-section analysis
(Table 7): the treated group spent less than the untreated
group on health care and were less exposed to catastrophic
expenditure than non-beneficiaries at the lower threshold
of 20%, but not at the higher 40% threshold. The impact
was statistically significant for household expenditure
(19% lower for the treated), household expenditure on
inpatient care (27% lower), expenditure on self-medica-
tion (16% lower), and exposure to catastrophic health
expenditure at the 20% threshold (18% lower).
Panel analysis with double differences
Impact on utilization
The results of the panel analysis (last column of Table 6)
were generally consistent with the findings of the cross-
section analysis for the outpatient utilization variables
and indicated a general, albeit small, increase in overall
utilization and a shift from private to public care. How-
ever, the positive impact on the number of visits at the
commune health center was the only statistically signifi-
cant effect. For inpatient utilization, no or very small dif-
ferences between the treated and the untreated group were
found.
Impact on out-of-pocket expenditure
With the exceptions of expenditure on outpatient care and
self-medication, the results of the panel analysis (last col-
umn of Table 7) displayed some differences compared to
the findings of the cross-section analysis. The panel results
indicated a larger reduction among the treated in terms of
total household and per capita expenditure on health,
inpatient care (the only variable with a statistically signif-
icant difference), and catastrophic expenditure at the 20%International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:20 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/20
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threshold. However, the opposite effect was found for
expenditure on outpatient care and self-medication,
which means that the ratio of outpatient vs. inpatient
expenditure was lower in 2002, relative to the ratio in
2004. In other words, the residual impact, in 2004, of pre-
vious policies and programs to finance health care for the
poor was higher for expenditure on outpatient compared
to inpatient care. This lower effectiveness of previous pro-
grams in reducing spending on inpatient care compared
to the HCFP is to be expected given the much lower levels
of benefits or assistance for indirect costs in programs
prior to HCFP.
Sensitivity analysis
In addition to the comparison of impact for those eligible
for benefits who had a card versus those who did not,
which is where we expect to see the largest impact, we also
explored two additional comparisons: between eligible
beneficiaries with a card and those ineligible for the
HCFP; and between eligible beneficiaries without a card
and those ineligible for HCFP benefits. The reason for
these additional comparisons is that the comparison
between eligible with and without a card, assumes that
those without a card did not receive any benefits from the
policy. If this assumption holds, the comparison would
measure the impact of the program on beneficiaries. How-
ever, it is possible that even those without a card may have
received benefits, which seems to indeed have occurred.
For example, some provinces reported that during the
time before they could arrange to issue cards, the health
care used by poor people would be reimbursed from the
health care fund for the poor. This would lead to an
underestimate of the program's impact, which is why we
explored the two other comparisons. However, most eligi-
ble beneficiaries had been issued with a card at the time of
the 2004 VHLSS survey. Furthermore, the first compari-
son is the main focus of the paper. The other comparisons
are secondary and intended to identify any underestimate
of impact because eligible without a card might also have
received benefits.
Matching was more successful in the original comparison.
The two measures of covariate balance – reduction in
standardized bias and pseudo R2 of the logistic regressions
used to estimate the propensity scores – indicate that
matching reduces bias significantly more in this compari-
son than in the additional two comparisons. The addi-
tional two comparisons also required a larger trimming of
the sample, leaving fewer observations for analysis. The
results for the first comparison can therefore be consid-
Table 6: Estimated impact on health care utilization
Cross-section 2004 Panel 2002–2004
Variable Average for
treated
Average for
untreated
Single difference
in averages
% difference Boot-strapped
Std. Err.
P-
value
Double differences/
differences-in-
differences (absolute)
No. of outpatient (OP) 
visits in the 12-month 
recall period
0.818 0.786 0.033 4% 0.060 0.585 0.06
no. of OP visits at 
commune level clinics
0.380 0.308 0.072 23% 0.034 0.034 0.10
no. of OP visits at 
district hospital
0.144 0.078 0.066 85% 0.022 0.003 Not available
no. of OP visits at 
provincial/central 
hospital
0.051 0.029 0.022 74% 0.009 0.018 Not available
no. of OP visits at 
govt. hospital
0.195 0.107 0.088 82% 0.025 0.000 0.08
no. of OP visits at 
private facility
0.222 0.357 -0.135 -38% 0.039 0.000 -0.12
No. of inpatient (IP) 
admissions in the 12-
month recall period
0.125 0.118 0.007 6% 0.012 0.557 0.00
no. of IP admissions at 
commune level clinics
0.026 0.037 -0.010 -28% 0.004 0.020 0.00
no. of IP admissions at 
district hospital
0.060 0.038 0.023 60% 0.008 0.003 Not available
no. of IP admissions at 
provincial/central 
hospital
0.035 0.038 -0.002 -6% 0.006 0.721 Not available
no. of IP admissions at 
govt. hospital
0.096 0.075 0.021 27% 0.011 0.065 0.02
Note: Statistically significant results (95% confidence level) are in boldface.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:20 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/20
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ered to be more reliable and are therefore reported in this
paper. Nonetheless, the additional comparisons were gen-
erally, but not always, consistent with the findings of the
first comparison.
We also explored outliers in the data. Outliers may result
from interviewer recording errors or data entry errors, in
which case they should be corrected or dropped. How-
ever, outliers may also be unusual, but correctly entered,
observations, in which case they should be retained. The
available information in the VHLSS did not allow us to
distinguish between the two possibilities and hence to
know whether the observations should be dropped or
retained. Accordingly, and given that the outliers we iden-
tified seemed plausible and did not affect the results in a
significant manner, all outliers were retained.
Discussion and conclusion
Discussion of methods
This study has evaluated the impact of the HCFP on utili-
zation and expenditure during the initial period of the
program. We applied propensity score matching to find a
suitable comparison group for the treated population. We
have presented the results of two alternative PSM-tech-
niques to measure impact: single differences analysis of
the 2004 cross-section and double differences analysis of
the 2002–2004 panel.
One could make an argument for only presenting the
results of the double differences analysis on the panel
data, since it eliminates bias due to fixed effects. As such,
double differences estimates are preferable to the single
difference estimates. However, the impact of the HCFP
cannot be measured in relation to a situation of no pro-
gram using the panel data, since other programs to assist
the poor and disadvantaged groups were in place prior to
the HCFP. In other words, the baseline data of the VHLSS
2002 may reflect the impact of previous programs, such as
health insurance for the poor (although these previous
programs covered only about 11% of the poor with a
reduced benefit package). This problem was raised by
Wagstaff, who also suggested that the value of a double
difference analysis would be further diminished because
the panel 2002–2004 represents a minority of households
and because the health utilization questions were differ-
ent in the two surveys [27]. Apart from a much reduced
sample size, which is important, the problem with the
double differences analysis of the panel data is that it only
provides an estimate of the marginal impact of HCFP over
its predecessor programs.) Wagstaff therefore did not con-
duct an analysis of the panel data. Because of the potential
problems with the double differences panel analysis, we
have focused on the results of the single differences cross-
section analysis.
However, it can be argued that confounding from previ-
ous programs is limited, given that they achieved such low
coverage and limited impact on outcomes. Finally, the
panel dataset contain more than 4,100 households, which
should provide us with an adequate sample size for most
Table 7: Estimated impact on health expenditure (in Vietnamese Dong, VND)
Cross-section 2004 Panel 2002–2004
Variable Average for
treated
Average for
untreated
Difference in 
averages
% difference Boot-strapped
Std. Err.
P-
value
Double differences/
differences-in-
differences
(absolute)
Real per capita annual 
household health 
expenditure in the 12-
month recall period
122.061 142.286 -20.226 -14% 12.597 0.108 -2.95
Real annual household 
health expenditure
615.193 757.514 -142.322 -19% 56.166 0.011 -52.06
Real annual household 
expenditure on OP care
215.971 230.841 -14.870 -6% 25.490 0.560 55.07
Real annual household 
expenditure on IP care
247.785 338.748 -90.963 -27% 37.684 0.016 -134.55
Real annual household 
expenditure on self-
medication
144.558 171.236 -26.678 -16% 12.307 0.030 19.37
% of households with 
catastrophic health 
expenditure (20%)
0.210 0.258 -0.048 -18% 0.015 0.002 -0.04
% of households with 
catastrophic health 
expenditure (40%)
0.074 0.072 0.002 3% 0.010 0.800 0.01
Note: Statistically significant results (95% confidence level) are in boldface.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:20 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/20
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outcomes (the main exception is inpatient care, which is
much less frequently reported). Because of the important
effect elimination of fixed effects can have on the results,
and because we believe the double difference panel anal-
ysis is feasible, we have therefore presented the results of
those as well. While the double differences results are less
conclusive than the single differences, they do generally
support the results of the single differences and point to
the same general direction of the impact of the program,
as we shall see in the next section. The combination of
using both single differences and double differences to
these data provides us with the ability to conduct a strong
analysis of this program.
Discussion of results
This study found that the program achieved positive out-
comes in a short time-period. There was a small impact on
overall utilization of health care. Given that there was a
significant negative impact on OOP expenditure, the
results also indicate a reduction in expenditure per health
event or unit of utilization. The reduced OOP expenditure
is consistent with a study by Sepehri et al. on the effects of
health insurance in Vietnam [37]. Beneficiaries were less
exposed to catastrophic health expenditure at the lower
threshold of 20%. They also reduced their expenditure on
self-treatment, which is consistent with findings of studies
on the effect of insurance on self-treatment in Vietnam
[38,39]. This result is particularly encouraging in a coun-
try like Vietnam, where purchases of prescription and
non-prescription medicines from pharmacies and drug
vendors with limited qualifications accounted for around
42% of all health expenditure between 2000 to 2003 [12].
The substitution effect away from private to public provid-
ers, and particularly to higher levels of care, may be an
indication that the HCFP alleviated financial barriers to
accessing higher levels of care and thus responded to an
unmet need. Beneficiaries may have received better qual-
ity of care, since district and higher level hospitals are gen-
erally better equipped and staffed than commune level
clinics and private practitioners. However, the implica-
tions of this response to the HCFP by its beneficiaries war-
rant careful consideration by policy-makers to inform
planning and resource allocation decisions. Adequate
financial and human resources must be put in place to
meet the increased demand for services generated by the
HCFP. Investments may be needed in upgrading commu-
nity health centers and ensuring a functioning referral sys-
tem to ensure that conditions are treated at the most
appropriate and cost-effective level of care.
Moreover, given that the private sector still constitutes an
important source of care for the poor and the ethnic
minorities, it needs to be better integrated into the pro-
gram. Quality of care could be strengthened by setting
appropriate incentives through performance-based con-
tracting, effective regulation, and training programs.
The study found a smaller impact on utilization of inpa-
tient compared to outpatient care. A plausible explanation
is that the program has not been able to fully address the
financial barriers faced by the poor. Indirect costs of care,
such as transportation, food, loss of income and the
opportunity costs of the time of caregivers, can be sub-
stantial and tend to be larger for inpatient care compared
to outpatient care.
The findings of recent studies that have analyzed the
impact of the HCFP are generally consistent with this
study's results. An analysis of MOH Health Information
System data by Bales et al. found that utilization of the
government health services increased more rapidly during
the period 2003–2005 than during the period 1997–
2002, and particularly in provinces in which HCFP bene-
ficiaries are more than 20% of the population [19]. A
small-scale evaluation in two provinces also found evi-
dence of increased utilization and reduced health expend-
iture among beneficiaries of the program [40]. The
findings of Wagstaff are less consistent with our results
[27]. Wagstaff found that the HCFP substantially
increased service utilization, especially inpatient care
(while we found a larger increase in outpatient care), and
reduced the risk of catastrophic expenditure (our results
were inconclusive on this issue), but did not find evidence
of a reduction in average OOP expenditure (our study
did). However, some similarities in the results were iden-
tified. Similarly to this study, Wagstaff found a substantial
and significant shift from private outpatient care to public
outpatient care.
Data Limitations
Most questions are consistent between the 2002 and 2004
VHLSS surveys. However, changes were made to improve
data collection in the health section between the 2002
and 2004 surveys, which led to some problems in compa-
rability. While both surveys used a 12-month recall
period, the VHLSS 2004 questionnaire on outpatient care
included questions on illness to help respondents recall
health care utilization, and allowed recording of multiple
visits to the same facility on the same line. These changes
presumably helped respondents to recall utilization
events and might therefore have led to an upward bias in
utilization figures for the VHLSS 2004 compared to the
VHLSS 2002. However, we believe that it is unlikely that
any reporting errors are systematically different between
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the program.
Another limitation is that the VHLSS does not contain var-
iables on timeliness of seeking care and length of stay.
Finally, the VHLSS 2002 did not separate the level of gov-
ernment hospital.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:20 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/20
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Lessons for low and middle-income countries
The design, implementation and outcomes of health
reforms are often context-specific and may not always be
transferable to other countries. However, there are lessons
from Vietnam's early experiences with the HCFP that may
be applicable to other low and middle-income countries
that are planning or undergoing similar health reforms
designed to increase health care access and utilization,
and reduce the financial burden of health expenditures.
First, the results indicate that it is possible to achieve pos-
itive impact on outcomes such as health care utilization
and out-of-pocket expenditure in a short-term period.
This is critically important for policy makers, who are
often under pressure to show quick results and to show
that pro-poor financing reforms have their intended con-
sequences.
Second, the failure of the programs in the 1990s suggest
that it is critical that any efforts to target the poor are
backed by adequate and sustained funding to ensure that
providers are adequately reimbursed, particularly given
their increased workload as a result of increased utiliza-
tion due to the HCFP scheme. Inadequate reimbursement
of providers was one of the reasons why the previous pro-
grams in Vietnam failed [41]. Vietnam has benefited from
strong and sustained economic growth over the past 15
years, which has allowed the central government to pro-
vide most of the financing for the HCFP. Other countries
will need to create the necessary fiscal space to ensure that
pro-poor financing reforms are funded in a sustainable
manner [42].
Third, the HCFP has benefited from effective targeting
with limited leakage. The program took advantage of
other targeting mechanisms and a decentralized and prag-
matic approach to the identification of HCFP beneficiar-
ies [43]. Other countries with limited resources can
benefit from a similar approach.
Fourth, the HCFP is implemented through the national
health insurance system, which has reduced transaction
costs and also increased transparency through a uniform
benefit package. However, the HCFP benefit package is
quite generous and has increased the financial strain on
the health insurance system. The scope of the benefit
package and its implications for sustainability is some-
thing that other countries planning and implementing
similar reforms need to carefully consider and monitor.
Furthermore, VSS uses fee-for-service with budget ceilings
as a reimbursement method and this provides perverse
incentives to providers. This has been particularly prob-
lematic in the voluntary health insurance scheme, where
provider-induced demand, moral hazard and adverse
selection have led to significant over-spending. If the over-
spending is not contained, in the long-run this will
present a serious threat to the sustainability of the overall
health insurance system, including the HCFP. In a sense
this is unfair to the HCFP, since financial reports suggest
that none of the provinces has over-spent its HCFP budget
allocations.
Fifth, it is critical that provinces and central governments
ensure that there is capacity to manage any financing pro-
gram for the poor. In Vietnam, the delay in distributing
cards for the HCFP, responding to queries of beneficiaries
related to waiting time, and information about the use of
the card could be attributed to a lack of capacity, which
can adversely effect the implementation and finally the
impact of HCFP policy. For example, lack of knowledge
and information and the limited responsiveness of the
system prevent some beneficiaries from seeking seek care
under HCFP.
Sixth, addressing indirect costs of health care utilization is
important. The HCFP includes some direct subsidies for
transport and food. However, an argument could be made
that because of high transaction costs such funds might be
better spent on establishing a functioning referral system,
including adequate transportation to higher levels of care.
Finally, it is important that systematic and routine moni-
toring and impact evaluation efforts are built into the
design, implementation, and funding of health reform
programs. For example, Mexico has invested significant
efforts and resources in developing capacity to monitor
and evaluate the impact of its health reform programs
[44]. Vietnam, on the other hand, did not strengthen
administrative capacity to manage the scheme, not did it
explicitly plan for impact evaluations of the HCFP. This
study took advantage of the availability of national house-
hold survey data, the nature of which allowed for meas-
urement of the program's impact.
Suggestions for future research
While the HCFP would benefit from routine collection of
data for monitoring purposes, the analysis of future living
standard surveys can complement such efforts and will be
useful for exploring the medium and long-term impact of
the program, including effects on living standard meas-
ures, such as income, consumption and poverty, and
health outcomes, which take longer to emerge than effects
on utilization and expenditure.
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